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The Korean War and the post-war prisoners of war (POW) regime, 1945-1956
The creation of the post-war international legal regime for prisoners of war
(POW), poses historians with something of a paradox. Never before had the
need to update the humanitarian codes been more glaringly apparent. In
Europe and Asia, war fighting between 1939 and 1945 had assumed an almost
medieval quality. Captives had frequently been killed, enslaved or conscripted
into their enemies’ armed forces; whole cities were obliterated by firestorms,
whole peoples threatened with extinction. And yet despite these excesses, the
international community’s willingness and capacity to revise the Geneva
2conventions remained open to question. Cold War political tensions
contaminated international dialogue and distracted discussions over the future
of humanitarianism and international law. The fact that a fresh set of
conventions were agreed in 1949, including, for the first time, one covering
civilians, was clearly ‘a noteworthy event in this day and age’, as one
participant put it, but the outcome had been confusing and contradictory.1 The
western powers found themselves pressing for elements in the civilian code
which they had only recently condemned at the Nuremburg trials.2 More
worryingly, the arrival of atomic weapons cast doubt over whether
conceptions of humanity, discrimination and proportionality were still
relevant. Contemporary commentators like J. M. Spaight were therefore left
‘puzzled’ by the ‘failure of the powers [...], to do anything to regulate those
methods of war which, if continued, will make the [conventions’] humanitarian
provisions […] read like hypocritical nonsense’.3
How the 1949 Conventions came into being, and the compromises and
deals that were struck on the way, have been thoroughly explored elsewhere,
and it serves no point to repeat the exercise here.4 Instead, this paper will
focus on one of the key elements of the post-war ‘POW regime’; namely the
role of neutral bodies – state authorities acting as ‘protecting powers’ or
humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) – in supervising the implementation of the 1949 POW convention. The
role of oversight mechanisms was by no means new in 1949. By the time of the
Great War, all major belligerents had come to rely on neutral ‘protecting
powers’ to supplement the work of civilian aid agencies and meet the needs of
their nationals in enemy hands.5 The success of these initiatives led to
protecting powers being accorded specific responsibilities in the POW
convention of 1929. Although protecting powers were excluded from the Red
3Cross convention (dealing with sick and wounded on the battlefield) and states
disagreed over the balance between the rights of the neutral inspectors and
the security interests of the detaining powers, all of the major former
belligerents agreed that protecting powers were needed to hold belligerents to
their obligations under the POW convention.6 ‘Organs of control’ were,
therefore, a core element in the modern POW regime: attitudes towards them
after 1945 promises to tell us a great deal about contemporary expectations.7
This paper will examine the post-war debates over the type of organs of
control required in the revised POW convention, and then assess how these
faired in their first real test, the Korean War of 1950-1953. Before doing so, it
will address what lessons the international community drew from its
experiences in the 2nd world war and how these shaped future debates.
*
The general collapse of accepted standards of behaviour – by all sides – after
1937 was inevitably mirrored in the experience of the protecting powers and
humanitarian agencies. Contrary to expectations, it was not so much the
expansion of the concept of military necessity that stymied the work of neutral
inspectors, as the political and ideological interests of the belligerents
themselves.8 Berlin’s dismissal of Swedish efforts to protect Polish prisoners
after 1939, on the grounds that Poland no longer existed as a state, was an
early harbinger of a policy that was soon extended to most corners of Hitler’s
New Order.9 An exception was made for Vichy France where Berlin grudgingly
allowed the Vichy minister, George Scapini, to represent the interests of the
1.8 million French prisoners remaining in Germany after the armistice. But this
was prompted by political considerations – a desire to shore up support for the
4Vichy regime amongst French prisoners and workmen in the Reich – not
humanitarian, and Scapini’s authority fell short of that stipulated under the
convention.10 Moscow’s attempt to enlist Swedish protection after July 1941
was rebuffed, with disastrous consequences for POW mortality rates on both
sides of the eastern front.11 A similar situation existed in the Far East, where
Tokyo applied the convention selectively. Although practice varied between
different theatres, non-western prisoners were typically denied external
assistance, and tight travel restrictions on neutral diplomats and delegates
from the YMCA and ICRC ensured that European prisoners had largely to
survive without the benefit of outside help for the duration of the war.12
Taking the war as a whole, some seventy percent of prisoners lived beyond the
reach of third party protection.13
Yet if, in global terms, the record was a bleak one, the fact remains that
in certain circumstances even brutal states such as the 3rd Reich would
moderate their behaviour out of a concern for its impact on neutral inspection
reports. The majority of British protests lodged by American diplomats in Berlin
before December 1941 received satisfactory replies. Washington even came
close to convincing the two belligerents to hold face-to-face talks over POW
issues in the spring of 1941. The Swiss, though lacking Washington’s political
muscle, capitalised on their position in representing both parties to the
conflict, and helped head off several potential crises involving the treatment of
POWs.14 Swiss diplomats were generally held in high regard, despite grumbles
over the wording of camp inspection reports, or Berne’s occasional foray into
areas deemed beyond its authority. The summary execution of the Allied ‘great
escapers’ in early 1944 naturally underlined the fragility of the POW regime
and the speed with which Hitler’s regime could slip into barbarism. But the fact
that this brutality was the exception rather than the rule had much to do with
5the presence of Swiss diplomats and ICRC delegates, holding the Nazi regime
to its obligations under the POW convention, even in its final death throws.15
The 2nd world war thus provided a mixed legacy for third party
involvement in POW affairs. Protecting powers, the principal ‘organs of
control’, remained widely recognised as the institution of choice, where ever
possible. Their greatest supporter was probably the UK government, whose
long experience of US protection, dating back to the Boer War, had made it
particularly partial to state-based protection. Even states denied direct formal
assistance of protecting powers, emerged from the war convinced in their
utility. The one notable exception to this was the Soviet Union. Not only had
Moscow fought the war entirely without the services of a protecting power,
but it had refused to acknowledge Switzerland’s claims to neutrality, on
account of the real and perceived level of Swiss collaboration with the Nazi
regime. Tentative Swiss attempts to re-establish diplomatic ties in late 1944
were publicly buffed, triggering the resignation of the Swiss foreign minister
shortly afterwards; the following year Berne had to seek British help to secure
the timely release of its Berlin embassy staff from Soviet custody.
The war’s legacy for humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC was
even more problematic. Although the ICRC had been formally recognised in the
1929 POW convention, its role was limited to dispensing ‘humanitarian
services’. Consequently, almost every aspect of its work for POWs depended
on it first securing prior agreement from the governments concerned. True,
the ICRC’s delegates had furnished valuable camp inspection reports, overseen
the repatriation of sick and wounded POWs and arranged for the delivery of
relief parcels. It had also interceded in support of individuals – civilian
internees and camp inmates – who lay beyond the reach of the protecting
powers. Its efforts to bring succour to prisoners in the Far East probably
6exceeded those of the protecting power.16 But the war left deep scars on the
ICRC’s reputation. Its failure to speak out against the Holocaust, the intimacy of
its relations with the Reich’s leadership, its delegates’ naivety in working with
the Axis occupation forces in distributing relief supplies and their embroilment
in Germany’s exploitation of the Katyn incident in 1943, left the institution
open to charges of collaboration that were difficult to shrug off.17 Geneva’s
standing with the western governments were likewise marred by its outspoken
criticism of Allied bombing of Axis cities, blockade of food supplies and denial
of POW status from surrendered enemy forces in 1945.18 Finally, Geneva’s
success in providing relief parcels was slowly eclipsed, especially in American
eyes, by the role assumed by the national Red Cross societies – who produced
the majority of the parcels – and the work undertaken at the international
level by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).19
Such work appeared to signal a shift in the focus of international relief activity
from Geneva to New York and into the hands of the national societies, and
stymie the ICRC’s hopes of staking a claim over this area of activity.
**
The task of revising the 1929 conventions, and negotiating a code for the
protection of civilians, was carried out over a four year period, culminating in a
diplomatic conference in Geneva between 21 April and 12 August 1949. In
between, the matter was debated at a number of Red Cross and governmental
meetings, including the XVII International Red Cross conference in Stockholm
in August 1948. Some components of the new supervisory mechanisms were
agreed with little ado.20 The priority given to official protecting powers was
accepted early on. ‘Common article 8’, found in all of the 1949 conventions
7stated that they ‘shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny
of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the
Parties to the Conflict’. (emphasis added) A consensus also emerged over the
need to block recourse to ‘Scapini’ missions. ‘Common article 10’ prohibited
the substitution of protecting powers with inferior agencies, based on ‘special
agreements between the Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily,
in its freedom to negotiate with the other Power or its allies by reason of
military events, more particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the
territory of the said Power is occupied’.
So widespread was the belief in the importance of proper third party
assistance that from the earliest drafts, agreement was reached on
establishing what might be called a ‘hierarchy of protection’. At the top was
the traditional protecting power, operating with the consent of all parties, and
with responsibilities eventually itemised in 34 of the 143 articles of the 1949
POW convention. If this was not possible, for whatever reason, the detaining
power was to request a second neutral state or ‘an organisation which offers
all guarantees of impartiality and efficiency’ to act as a ‘substitute’ protecting
power. If all else failed, detaining powers were to ‘request’ or ‘accept’ the
services of ‘a humanitarian organisation such as the ICRC’ which would
‘assume the humanitarian functions performed by protecting powers’. Though
inelegantly expressed, the ‘hierarchy of protection’ offered a chance of tackling
the problems uncovered in the last war. Never before had the safety-net of
prisoner protection and third party surveillance of the conventions been so
tightly woven.21
This was, however, the limit of the post-war consensus, and divisions
over some of the outstanding issues proved so intractable that they came close
to jeopardising the entire exercise. As in 1929, one of the central areas of
8debate concerned the scope of protecting powers’ supervisory authority and
the extent to which they could encroach on state prerogatives. In keeping with
the attitude shown after 1941, Moscow was inclined to limit the scope of the
protecting power mandates. An amendment tabled at the diplomatic
conference called for an injunction against protecting powers ‘infring[ing] the
sovereignty of the State’ or acting in ‘opposition to State security or military
requirements’. The western powers, by contrast, whose servicemen had
generally benefited from third party protection, were reluctant to see neutral
inspectors unduly impeded.22 When put to a vote, the majority decided that
Moscow’s concerns over state sovereignty were misplaced. After all, the
protecting powers’ authority was restricted to only those actions required to
ensure that parties lived up to their commitments, and in ratifying the
convention, states freely entered into accepting these commitments.23 A
compromise solution, sufficient to satisfy Soviet anxieties, was eventually
agreed, whereby protecting powers were, at all times, to ‘take account of the
imperative necessities of security of the State’ and avoid ‘exceed[ing] their
mission under the ... Convention’. An additional clause was added to the sick
and wounded conventions – though not the POW and civilian codes – allowing
states to impose ‘exceptional and temporary’ restrictions on the protecting
power if ‘rendered necessary by imperative military necessities’.24
Given the breadth of their duties, the possibility of protecting powers
falling foul of these restrictions was perhaps slim. But the latitude left for
detaining powers to define ‘imperative necessity’ naturally disappointed those
who had hoped to have closed this loophole at the Stockholm conference the
previous year. Still, the fact that some accommodation had to be found on this
issue was hardly new: the balance between humanitarianism and military
necessity has been a recurrent theme since the 1860s, and in 1949, the Soviet
9Union merely represented a position that had been held, twenty years earlier,
by the Japanese and Romanians. It was, in this sense, a modern version of a
familiar refrain.25
What was new in the post-war debates, were questions over the identity
and scope of those institutions included in the convention’s ‘hierarchy of
protection’. The first of these concerned the kind of institution deemed
capable in extremis of acting in lieu of protecting powers. Discussion on this
issue partly boiled down to a question of what role the ICRC should occupy as
an ‘organ of control’. At first sight, this might seem rather odd. After all, the
ICRC had begun the codification of customary practice in 1864, and had been
the principal architect and guardian of international humanitarian law ever
since. It was the ICRC that had first called for a revision of the conventions in
1945 and shepherded successive drafts through subsequent meetings. In a
conference of national Red Cross societies held in the summer of 1946, most
agreed that specific areas of competency for the ICRC had to be spelt out in
the new conventions.26
Critics of the ICRC were, however, thick on the ground after 1945 and
there was no certainty that it would be able to retain its position, as of right, in
the new conventions. The institution had already found itself under pressure in
1945 when the western powers resisted ICRC efforts to provide succour to Axis
servicemen, who had been re-categorised as ‘surrendered enemy personnel’
and denied protection under the POW convention.27 But its most outspoken
critic was the Soviet government. Moscow’s opposition was so trenchant that
it absented itself from all meetings before 1949 on the grounds that the ICRC’s
lamentable wartime conduct disqualified it from hosting such events. Its
denunciation of the ICRC three days before the opening of the Red Cross
conference in Stockholm was particularly caustic and prompted the organisers
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to reschedule the first day’s proceedings to allow the ICRC president, Paul
Ruegger, to respond to Soviet charges. Ruegger’s speech and the three volume
report on the ICRC’s wartime operations published for the occasion were well
received, but few present could ignore the fact that Soviet opposition to the
committee was deep-seated and likely to shape its subsequent view of the
conventions.28
In reality, Soviet criticism of the committee was important not so much
in affecting the outcome of any particular vote – the eastern bloc vote was too
small to muster a majority – but rather in influencing behaviour of other
delegations. Geoffrey Best has argued that French delegations were
particularly sensitive to Soviet wishes, in large part due to the waxing electoral
fortunes of the communist party at home. He suggests that the French
proposal for a ‘high international committee’ to oversee the conventions was
essentially driven by the desire to keep Moscow happy and provide an
alternative mechanism to the ICRC.29 The ‘high international committee’
comprising of thirty distinguished lawyers, luminaries and international ‘elder
statesmen’ was to be convened at the start of a conflict to ‘supervise the
application and ensure respect for the convention’. In fact, the Cahen-Salvador
proposal, named after the lead French delegate, reflected a trend in French
thinking that extended back before the war – the French had proposed a
similar body at the 1929 conference – and was designed to deal with situations
in which there were no neutral states to act as protecting powers, and no
neutral Switzerland to provide a base for the ICRC. First raised in 1947, the
proposal for a high international committee had particular traction at the
diplomatic conference where ‘extreme pressure’ from the French had secured
the presidency of one of the commissions for Cahen-Salvador.30 Although the
proposal was turned down – there were doubts over how a ‘high international
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committee’ would operate in the circumstances envisaged – the conference
adopted a resolution urging states to investigate the matter further. French
efforts to keep it on the diplomatic agenda in the early 1950s failed, but the
issue continued to be discussed in other forums for a further decade. The
International Law Association debated the issue at its annual conference in
1964, and it resonated with particular force in the International Committee for
Military Medicine and International Committee for the Neutrality of Medicine,
both of which were anxious to insulate military medicine from Cold War
pressures and ensure respect for medical units operating under the
conventions.31
Cahen-Salvador’s proposal was, however, only one of a number of
initiatives that emerged over the period that threatened to undercut the ICRC’s
standing in the Red Cross movement and, by extension, its place in the new
conventions. By the eve of the Geneva Conference, the ICRC faced challenges
from two different directions. On the one hand, the eastern bloc societies,
suspicious of the committee’s western, ‘bourgeois’ leanings insisted that its
membership be ‘internationalised’ through the introduction of members from
across both sides of the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, some western
societies were anxious to bridge the gap between the international committee
and the umbrella organisation for the national societies, the League of Red
Cross Societies. The Swedish, American, French and Belgian societies all lent
their voice to calls for a ‘standing commission’, chaired by the charismatic vice-
president of the Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, to sit between
the ICRC and the League and coordinate their respective activities.32 In both
cases, the ICRC was confronted with a challenge to its leadership of the Red
Cross family and its authority as the principal supervisory institution for the
movement in times of war.
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Over time, the danger of a fissure opening up along Cold War lines
gradually helped rein in some of the western societies’ enthusiasm for reform.
But while pressure on the ICRC ebbed, lingering doubts over the suitability of
its statutes, form and membership inevitably coloured thinking over the
wisdom of leaving the ICRC as the principal default ‘organ of control’ in the
revised conventions.33 The committee’s very ‘Swissness’, hitherto a guarantee
for its neutrality and independence, was much less valued in a world governed
by a United Nations charter that cast doubt over the viability of neutrality in
international politics, or one teetering on the brink of another global war.34
Moscow’s outspoken criticism of the committee before the Stockholm
conference inevitably threw such concerns into sharp relief. As Harold Starr,
head of the American Red Cross delegation in 1948 bluntly put it; ‘as the ICRC
was no longer persona grata with the USSR and its neighbours, it was not
opportune, if one desires to have these states adhere to the new conventions,
to allow the ICRC to figure prominently [in the conventions]’.35
In line with this thinking, Starr tabled a series of proposals at Stockholm
which effectively airbrushed the committee out of the revised conventions,
and replaced it with a ‘competent international body’, a term that was
sufficiently vague to leave open the possibility of a variety of ad hoc
institutions, whether drawn from the international Red Cross movement or
not. The American amendments not only covered prisoners’ external relations
and the ‘organs of control’, but included the ICRC’s role in transportation and
relief activities and its place in convening the ‘central POW information
agency’. It took all the tact and back-room diplomacy the ICRC delegates could
muster to overturn the American initiative. Part of the problem lay in the
Americans’ conflation of two different levels in the ‘hierarchy of protection’;
namely the ‘substitute protecting powers’ (neutral states that stepped in when
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the original protecting powers were unable to function) and the ‘quasi
protecting powers’ (‘humanitarian organisation such as the ICRC’, which would
‘assume the humanitarian functions performed by protecting powers’ where
state-based protection was not possible). Naturally, any thought that the ICRC
might act as a ‘substitute’ protecting power, rather than a ‘quasi’
(humanitarian) one entailed an accretion of powers to Geneva that would
elevate, rather than diminish, its status in the international Red Cross
movement. The fact the ICRC itself was averse to shouldering political
responsibilities under the convention – lest they interfere with its traditional
humanitarian activities – had little appreciable impact on American attitudes.
According to ICRC observers, it was only the ‘very dignified’ intervention of the
South African Red Cross delegate that swung the debate in the ICRC’s favour.
Even then, the ICRC only remained in the Stockholm draft as an ‘organ of
control’ by a vote of 10:8.36
Starr’s anxiety over the danger of naming the ICRC as a ‘quasi’ protecting
power was not entirely without foundation. As we will see, Moscow did
nothing to help the ICRC in North Korea after June 1950; thirty years later, it
barred the ICRC from operating inside Afghanistan. In 1949, however, Soviet
interests lay elsewhere, and much to Geneva’s relief, Moscow chose not to
contest the ICRC’s position in the conventions. Instead, and rather
unexpectedly, it turned its attention to the issue of the ‘substitute’ protecting
power. The crux of the Soviet position lay in their opposition to the idea that
the right to choose a substitute lay with the detaining power, as this opened
the possibility of interned Soviet civilians and servicemen being ‘protected’ by
a state, not of Moscow’s choosing. Soviet concerns were principally directed
towards the fate of their own personnel, but the fact that German and
Japanese POWs were still detained in Soviet camps from the last war was
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hardly lost on the other delegates.37 Moscow’s opposition to the ‘substitute
protecting power’ clause gave rise to one of only two ‘reservations’ tabled at
the signing ceremony, and was to have profound implications for western
confidence in the POW convention over the succeeding decades. The Soviets
refused to ‘recognise the validity of requests by the Detaining Power to a
neutral State or to a humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions
performed by a Protecting Power, unless the consent of the Government of
the country of which the protected person [POWs] are nationals has been
obtained’.38
When set alongside Moscow’s other reservation – its insistence on the
right to try prisoners for war crimes (article 85) – Soviet objections threatened
to frustrate the humanitarian ambitions of the conventions. Instead of taking
the convention’s criteria of ‘impartiality’ and ‘humanitarianism’ as good faith
guarantees to be lived up to, the Soviets’ sought to secure compliance through
the arbitrary power to withhold consent. In reality, it meant that in a Soviet-US
conflict, Washington would be obliged to employ a protecting power or
humanitarian organisation in order to meet its legal obligations, even though
Moscow, under its reservation, could withhold recognition. The Soviets, for
their part, could insist on drawing on the services of a communist aid society or
a satellite state which might, as a US State Department memorandum put it,
‘purposely have been kept apart from the hostilities to qualify as a neutral, to
“protect” the interests of US POWs and detainees in Russian hands’.39 Western
efforts to deal with the Soviet challenge were unsuccessful. Any objection to
the Soviet reservations ran the danger of either delaying Soviet ratification, or
provoking the Soviets into tabling objections to the various reservations made
by the western powers to articles in the civilian convention.40
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For all the progress made in bolstering the supervisory regime, the new
‘hierarchy of protection’ unveiled in 1949 was therefore noticeably weaker
than many scholars initially assumed.41 True, the ICRC’s status had been
elevated: its right to intervene on behalf of POWs was affirmed in thirteen
separate articles, and in explicitly defining its status as ‘an impartial
humanitarian body’ (arts 3 & 9), impartiality was acknowledged as a
‘constitutive quality’ of the ICRC (despite remaining a Swiss institution) rather
than merely a principle observed in the course of its operations.42 But the
defeat of Cahen-Salvador’s and Starr’s proposals scarcely amounted to a
ringing endorsement of the Geneva committee. Indeed, the back room tussles
only underscored the lack of confidence in the institution as currently
conceived. Equally troubling was the position of the protecting power. Though
their remit had been widened and clarified, the Soviet reservation cast doubt
over whether this vital element in the POW regime could remain insulated
from the corrosive effects of Cold War politics.
***
Debate over the robustness of the 1949 conventions’ oversight mechanisms
was overtaken by the outbreak of fighting in Korea in June 1950. Although the
1949 conventions were not in force – only Switzerland had ratified them by
this date, and many states suspended discussions for the duration of
hostilities43 – the warring parties all proclaimed their readiness to adhere to
the ‘humanitarian principles’ underpinning the conventions: the U.S. State
Department in a letter to the ICRC on 3 July, and Pyongyang ten days later, on
13 July. Today the war is principally remembered for the politicization of the
POW issue, with prisoners subjected to political indoctrination and scripted
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into propaganda films and broadcasts.44 Korean forces on both sides routinely
ill-treated their captives, and while the U.N. forces were frequently shocked by
the behaviour of their allies, they too had to resort to tanks and tear gas to
restore order amongst rioting communist prisoners at the U.N. detention
facilities at Koje-Do.45 Most famously, progress in the armistice talks, which
began in early July 1951, were repeatedly stalled over the issue of prisoners of
war, and the desire of the western governments to secure agreement on the
principle of ‘voluntary repatriation’ at the close of hostilities, as a ‘substitute
for victory’ over communist forces on the battlefield.46 The war was also,
however, an important test for the new norms of POW protection. As we will
see, the test was failed in nearly every respect; but the practices that emerged
in their wake had a profound impact on the shape of international
humanitarianism for the next half century.
Interestingly, neither side moved to employ a protecting power at the
outset of hostilities. While Pyongyang’s attitude towards the issue can be
deduced from its subsequent refusal to agree to external interference over its
POW policies, the West’s hesitation initially stemmed from a determination to
avoid any action likely to bestow political legitimacy on the North Korean
regime. As the U.N. intervention in Korea was deemed to be a ‘police action’,
not a war, the West did not consider the new conventions legally binding and
therefore limited their observance to only ‘such detailed provisions as [were]
appropriate to the situation’.47 The protecting power provisions were
noticeably excluded from these provisions.48
The arrival of Chinese ‘volunteers’ in Korea in November 1950 and the
headlong retreat of U.N. forces that ensued, prompted a rethink over the
question of POWs in western capitals. The options were, however, hardly
appealing. As no western state had recognised the North Korean regime, the
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coalition found itself facing precisely the situation envisaged in Moscow’s
reservation to the 1949 conventions. With only eastern bloc embassies in
Pyongyang, the choice of protecting power by early 1951 came down to either
the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia; neither of which were particularly
attractive to the western governments.49 Action was suspended over the first
half of the year in the hope that ICRC delegates would gain entry into North
Korea. It was only in the autumn, with the front stabilised and armistice talks
opened at Kaesong, that the U.N. Secretary General approached the Chinese
and North Korean governments, asking them to appoint a substitute protecting
power or accept the services of the ICRC as a ‘quasi’ protecting power.50
Western governments were rightly, as it turned out, sceptical over the chances
of success, and backed the initiative primarily to strengthen their negotiating
position at Kaesong.51 Statements by Chou Enlai the following July, hinting at
Peking’s willingness to recognise the 1949 conventions and the 1925 Geneva
gas protocol, prompted the West to appeal for Soviet assistance to sway
opinion in Peking and Pyongyang, but once again the initiative came to nought.
Chou Enlai’s trumpeting of the 1925 protocol was too convenient for
communist propaganda over the West’s alleged use of chemical weapons in
Korea to be taken seriously, while his flattering references to Soviet
reservations in the 1949 conventions, appeared to suggest that he was intent
on trying UN airmen for war crimes, while denying the ICRC access to the
conflict as a substitute protecting power. In both cases, it was difficult to see
how the interests of western POWs could be advanced by Peking’s sudden
affection for the humanitarian codes.52
An equally instrumentalist approach can be detected in attitudes
towards the ICRC. Geneva offered its services to both parties at the start of
hostilities, but was never formally invited to act as a ‘quasi’ protecting power.
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Consequently, just as in the 2nd World War, any initiatives on behalf of the
prisoners depended on securing the consent of the belligerent governments. In
the North, this was not forthcoming. Of the 200 communications sent by
Geneva to Pyongyang between June 1950 and December 1951, only two
elicited any reply. Paul Ruegger’s visit to Peking in the spring of 1951 provided
a brief glimmer of hope, but by the summer it was clear that the Chinese Red
Cross would not press the ICRC’s case or arrange for the distribution of medical
and relief supplies. Similar approaches via Moscow proved equally forlorn.
Peking denied responsibility for the Chinese ‘volunteers’ and remained
unmoved by Geneva’s release of names of communist prisoners held by the
U.N.53 The ICRC was thus forced to watch on impassively as communist ‘peace
movements’ and their western sympathisers were given free access to ‘report’
on the communist camps, while notification of the identity of individual
inmates filtered back to the West through staged radio broadcasts by ‘re-
educated’ prisoners.54
South of the 38th parallel, the situation was different. The fact that
Geneva had nothing to show for its efforts in the North did not materially
affect the scope or effectiveness of its advocacy and inspection work on behalf
of POWs in the South. In truth, despite repeatedly complaining about the
inconvenience and unreality of applying the POW convention unilaterally, the
U.N. command could do little but accept the ICRC’s presence. To do otherwise
would damage its international standing, add fuel to allegations over its use of
germ warfare agents, and banish any chance of delivering aid to its prisoners in
communist hands. Indeed, the military authorities came to value the ICRC’s
expertise, and occasionally appealed to its delegates to assist in areas that
were not explicitly ‘humanitarian’.55
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The lack of any sustained effort to adopt or adapt the convention’s
‘hierarchy of protection’ should prompt us to question the depth of western
commitment to these mechanisms. Clearly the existence of Moscow’s
reservations – and Chou Enlai’s apparent sympathy for them – cast doubts in
western minds over the whole question of POW protection. The politicization
of the POW issue during the war inevitably fanned western suspicions over
communist intentions, and strengthened the conviction that the 1949
conventions were ‘entirely inadequate for and inapplicable to’ a conflict with
the communist bloc.56
The re-emergence of neutrality in the early 1950s did, it is true, raise
hopes that ‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ protecting powers might yet survive the
onset of the Cold War. The four power Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission for Korea, though framing the European neutrals along ideological
lines, implied that predictions over the imminent demise of neutrality were
premature. Moscow’s flirtation with a ‘neutral’ Germany in the early 1950s,
the signing of the Austrian State treaty in 1955, and the gradual emergence of
‘third world’ neutralism under Indian leadership, inevitably strengthened this
belief, and goes some way to explaining the West’s renewed confidence in the
Geneva conventions by the late 1950s.
Yet, the real lesson taken from the Korean War was the belief that,
under Cold War conditions, it paid to operate outside the protecting power
framework. This conclusion obviously jarred with the concerns expressed by
the U.N. coalition over the fate of its men in communist hands. But there is
little doubt that the experience of confronting communism in the developing
world convinced many in the U.N. command that there was some advantage in
curtailing the work of the conventions’ ‘organs of control’. The rarefied,
academic discussions over whether the Korean War was a unique case under
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international law, soon gave way to the realisation that the conflict was
ultimately a harbinger of things to come. The benefit of withholding political
recognition from one’s adversary – whether in the form of a puppet
communist regime, or an anti-colonial insurgency – had obvious appeal.
The same was true for the informal character of the ICRC’s mandate.
Unlike the 1929 codes, protecting power arrangements were common to all
four of the 1949 conventions. The implications of this were not initially
appreciated by the U.N. command. In August 1950 General MacArthur
confidently announced that his forces would be guided by all four conventions,
but the conduct of fighting, not least the appalling treatment of civilians by
South Korean troops, soon convinced him to limit his responsibility to the POW
convention alone, and leave Seoul to answer questions on the civilian and Red
Cross conventions. As nothing was done to advertise this change, it was not
until the ICRC raised the issue in February 1951 that the U.S. government
became aware of the situation, and not until the middle of that year that the
U.N. command confirmed that it was ‘not extend[ing] recognition of the ICRC
with respect to all four conventions because of what its delegates might
discover and report’.57 Despite efforts to have the U.N. command live up to its
public pronouncements, the Red Cross, maritime and civilian conventions were
never applied to the Korean conflict. Indeed, the U.N. command attempted to
walk back from its commitment to the POW convention, by trying to
downgrade the status of ICRC delegates – from ‘accredited’ to ‘invited’ – and
insisting that their camp reports were submitted for comment first, before
being forwarded to the U.N. headquarters in New York.58
The ICRC took this in its stride, and chose not to make an issue out of the
U.N.’s difficulties at Koje Do or elsewhere. America’s ‘inexperience in managing
POW camps’ could, Paul Ruegger wryly remarked in conversation with the
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British foreign secretary in January 1953, ‘sometimes led them astray’, but
there was little doubt that the UN command was ‘doing [its] best to carry out
the various Geneva conventions’.59 As for the committee’s part in supervising
the application of the conventions, the events in Korea had clearly had a
chastening effect on Swiss thinking. By mid-1951, the committee was
increasingly warning its delegates to avoid encroaching into areas that properly
lay within the jurisdiction of the protecting power.60 By that winter, as the
conflict moved from the battlefield to court of world public opinion, the
committee issued a note on ‘alleged violations of international law’ in which it
sought to clarify its remit. While admitting to exercising ‘a certain degree of
supervision’ over the conventions, it insisted that ‘its essential task’ lay in
carrying on ‘the humanitarian work entrusted to it by the Conventions and
devolving on it under its Statutes and those of the International Red Cross.
Instead of passing judgement, the Red Cross must bring help. Before theorizing
about principles, it must translate them into action’.61 Such statements drew
approving nods in western capitals.
While, then, the West might sympathise, philosophically, with both the
principles and ambitions of the new conventions, the practical experience of
applying them within the new Cold War context, made them appear much less
attractive. Far better, to pare down the scope of the ‘organs of control’ and
rely on the traditional humanitarian functions of the ICRC, than expose
western conduct to the scrutiny of a protecting power, drawing on the full
authority of the 1949 conventions. This was just as true for confrontations with
the Soviet bloc – where captured enemy personnel would be regarded ‘more
as political refugees than as prisoners of war’62, and where their adversaries
questioned the whole premise of ‘substitute’ or ‘quasi’ protecting powers – as
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for conflicts with insurgent movements in the European colonial empires or
their post-colonial client states.
Though clearly troubled by the increasing politicisation of prisoner
treatment in Korea, western governments could afford themselves a guarded
sense of optimism over the shape of the POW regime. The major sticking
points during the armistice negotiations – the right of prisoners to seek asylum
and the right of parties to use unified command structures in dealing with
POW affairs – were both resolved in the West’s favour.63 Moreover, North
Korea’s challenge to the Geneva ‘norms’ had, at least in part, been overcome.
The high death-rates amongst U.N. prisoners were shocking, but no worse than
those experienced by Allied forces in the Far East and Pacific theatres during
the last war. Political indoctrination, which had led twenty-one Americans and
one Briton to remain in China after the end of hostilities, clearly rattled
western militaries. But while an attentive protecting power might, conceivably,
have helped mitigate the threat, the West could take comfort from the fact
that the matter could be tackled through improved training in ‘resistance to
interrogation’ and ‘conduct after capture’. In all events, the majority of states
who joined the U.N. coalition felt confident enough to ratify the POW
convention within a few years of the end of hostilities.
This should not, however, lead us to belittle the impact of the Korean
War on the development of the POW regime. The apparent self-evident
importance of establishing a robust system of oversight for the new
conventions did not long survive the conflict. Britain, France and Egypt
employed protecting powers during the Suez crisis in 1956, but on only three
occasions since then have states lived up to their treaty obligations and
accredited neutral states as protecting powers, and on each occasion,
‘exceptional’ circumstances were deemed to apply.64 It is ironic that just as the
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‘organs of control’ in international humanitarian law reached their apogee, the
international community chose to dispense with their services. The tireless
work of the ICRC has ensured that we have not seen the complete return to
barbarism that many had feared. But in insisting that it would ‘bring help’, not
‘pass judgement’ in its work, the ICRC was not merely reciting its founding
mantra; it was, instead, retreating from a tradition of advocacy and debate
that it had propagated during the Great War, but had increasingly discarded
since the early 1940s. No doubt, in the politically charged world of the Cold
War, this shift was wise, but it has left the conventions largely under-
supervised and allowed belligerents to ignore their treaty obligations without
fear of serious censure. Just as in Korea, ‘reciprocity’ has had little appreciable
effect on belligerent behaviour. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of armed
conflict since 1945 has been the denial of reciprocity; whether in the ‘bush-
fire’ wars of decolonisation, the inter-state conflicts along the political fault
lines in South Asia or the Gulf, or the more recent episodes in the ‘global war
on terror’, with tragic results for those detained by their enemies. Moreover, it
was not merely in the contraction of the humanitarian space where the
absence of a protecting power was felt. The protecting powers were equipped
and empowered to hold belligerents to account across a range of diplomatic
and humanitarian concerns. It is surely telling, that in deliberating over what it
had learnt from the Korean War, the ICRC was firmly of the view that had
protecting powers been present, political tensions between the belligerents
would have been eased, and the armistice negotiations brought to a speedier
conclusion. It was for this reason that the committee spoke out in favour of
protecting powers in international discussions over the course of the 1950s
and 1960s.65 As one senior member of the committee, Frédéric Siordet,
remarked in July 1954, ‘if protecting powers are not able to accomplish their
24
tasks in good faith, then the entire application of the conventions is
compromised’.66 The history of the last sixty years sadly bears out his
depressing prognosis.
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